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and the European Union
by David S. Yost
The defence-capabilities gap that divides the United States from its European
allies is real, and it matters. The gap can most usefully be viewed as the
aggregate of multiple gaps relating to the organisation and conduct of large-
scale expeditionary operations. Large transatlantic disparities in the ability to
mount such operations became painfully obvious during NATO’s Kosovo
intervention in March–June 1999 and spurred commitments on both sides of
the Atlantic to narrow the gap. However, a close examination of the European
Union’s post-Kosovo efforts to develop an autonomous military capability
reveals the serious obstacles to improving European forces.
Defining the Gap
It is difficult to make comparisons between US and European military
capabilities for at least three reasons. First, scenarios differ, and the employ-
ment of capabilities is scenario-dependent. Different capabilities can be used to
achieve similar results; similar capabilities can be used in different ways to
achieve distinct results and so on. Second, even in a simple comparison of
similar capabilities – for instance, air-refuelling aircraft – basic problems in
counting rules arise, quite aside from the quality of the aircraft and the
readiness and proficiency of the personnel.
The most fundamental ‘counting rule’ question is, who is coming to the
party? What forces are likely to be made available in specific contingencies? For
example, with over 600 tanker aircraft (KC-135s and KC-10As), the United
States has about ten times as many aerial-refuelling tankers as the NATO
European countries put together.  It is obviously preposterous, however, to
suppose that all US tanker aircraft would be available to deal with a crisis in
Europe: under all foreseeable circumstances, the United States would retain
some tanker aircraft in East Asia, the Persian Gulf and North America. For that
matter, France, the United Kingdom, and other European nations would also
probably retain some tanker aircraft at home for national defence purposes,
unless the contingency at hand threatened their own national survival.1
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As this judgement suggests, on the European side as well, the ‘who is
coming?’ question also involves political and force-allocation issues. Which
European nations should be counted in a gap assessment? Should all the
European Union nations be counted, or all the European members of NATO, or
both?2 Would it not be misleading to count all the capabilities of all these
nations when (a) participation in a ‘Petersberg task’ crisis-management opera-
tion is voluntary and hence optional and (b) no nation is likely to commit all of
its military forces to such an operation?3
Furthermore, the 15 members of the European Union have approved the
principle of ad hoc crisis management consultations with 15 other countries in
so-called ‘15-plus-15’ meetings.4 The other 15 countries consist of the six NATO
European countries not in the EU (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland,
Norway, Poland, and Turkey) and nine countries that have applied for EU
membership (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia,
Slovenia, and Romania). Should the US capabilities presumed available for a
specific operation be compared with those of all 30 countries that might
hypothetically participate in an EU-led operation?
The third factor complicating a US-European capabilities-gap assessment
also involves complex political judgements: the possibility of EU access to
common NATO assets and even, in some circumstances, US national assets
under the auspices of alliance-approved Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).
What are the NATO assets of interest to the European allies in CJTF? According
to one definition, NATO assets are those funded by NATO common infra-
structure budgets, such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft, headquarters elements, pipelines, radars and other air-defence and air
command-and-control systems, communications equipment, airfields and
storage depots. By another definition, NATO assets also encompass the US
capabilities regularly put at the disposal of NATO: air-refuelling capabilities,
heavy long-distance air transport for troops and equipment (such as C-141s, C-
5s, and C-17s), and satellite intelligence, communications, and navigation data.
US national assets clearly remain ultimately under US control, however, and
should not be attributed to Europeans in a gap assessment.
An Operational Definition of the Gap
The US–European capabilities gap should be defined as an aggregate of many
gaps. In some areas, there are technology gaps.5 In most areas, there are
investment and procurement gaps. These gaps add up to US superiority,
quantitative to be sure and sometimes qualitative, in many areas of military
capability. These include strategic mobility assets (such as aerial refuelling and
air transport), surface ships and submarines, precision-strike munitions,
electronic warfare, power projection (in the sense of long-range air and missile
strikes), and what the US military calls C4ISR (command, control, com-
munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).
The multiple gaps add up to significant US advantages. The United States is
currently superior to any combination of its European allies in its ability to
plan, conduct and sustain theatre-wide expeditionary operations. Of all the
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NATO allies, only the United States can project power in the form of large-scale
long-range non-nuclear air and missile strikes at great distances from its
homeland. Only the United States can deploy hundreds of military aircraft far
beyond its homeland and even transport the logistics to upgrade airfields with
limited facilities. The synergistic effects of pre-eminence in these areas (and
others) imply an even greater overall superiority.
Broad-brush descriptions of the gap are abundant. According to US
Secretary of Defense William Cohen, ‘NATO [European] countries spend
roughly 60% of what the United States does and they get about 10% of the
capability. That has to change.’6 As François Heisbourg, the French expert who
chairs the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, has pointed out,
With defence spending close to 60% of America’s, the Europeans could in theory be
expected to achieve 60% of US capabilities. They are probably below 10% in the
realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C4ISR, at substantially less than
20% in airlift capacity (by volume or tonnage), and possibly at less than 10% in terms
of precision guided air-deliverable ordnance.7
For George Robertson, the NATO Secretary-General and former British
Secretary of State for Defence,
The Kosovo air campaign demonstrated just how dependent the European Allies
had become on US military capabilities. From precision-guided weapons and all-
weather aircraft to ground troops that can get to the crisis quickly and then stay there
with adequate logistical support, the European Allies did not have enough of the
right stuff. On paper, Europe has 2 million men and women under arms – more than
the United States. But despite those 2 million soldiers, it was a struggle to come up
with 40,000 troops to deploy as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Something is wrong,
and Europe knows it.8
Origins of the Gap
In contrast with most of its European allies, the United States has been
preparing forces for trans-oceanic power projection for decades. The Cold War
scenario of a major NATO–Warsaw Pact war called for most NATO European
military establishments to ‘fight in place’ rather than to project troops or
firepower at great distances. Only Canada, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom were prepared to assist the United States with tasks such as
reinforcing Denmark, northern Italy, northern Norway and eastern Turkey;
and the United States was the main source of reinforcements for allied forces at
the inter-German border. Partly because the United States was deploying
forces from North America or even further afield, the US defence establishment
for decades built and improved fleets of large air-transport aircraft, air-to-air
refuelling tankers, carrier-battle groups, amphibious ships, and other mobility
assets relevant to trans-oceanic power projection and expeditionary operations.
The Americans also put more into logistic support than most of the other
allies, who were generally even less prepared for prolonged operations than
the United States. This pattern explains the situation alluded to by Robertson.
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Several European allies have found it difficult to organise forces to send to the
Balkans for peacekeeping because their troops lack logistic support. During the
Cold War, most NATO European troops were expected to leave their garrisons
and defend their nations against a Warsaw Pact assault; the Soviet and other
Warsaw Pact troops were expected to come to them. Several European allies
have, however, adapted slowly to the new circumstances and requirements;
they have continued with conscription and with Cold War force structures,
training and procurement patterns, with comparatively little investment in
mobility or logistic support.
Throughout the history of the alliance, the United States has spent a higher
percentage of its GNP on defence than most of the other allies and, to be sure,
far more in absolute terms. Because the European defence ministries have
generally spent significantly more than the Americans on personnel, they have
spent proportionately less on procurement. Moreover, the Europeans have
generally spent this smaller budget share less efficiently, partly because they
have bought less and partly because they have paid more for comparable
weapons.9 Furthermore, the Europeans have invested much less than the
Americans in military R&D, and the European efforts have for the most part
been scattered and dispersed in national programmes.
While the duplication of overhead costs in separate national procurement
and training establishments accounts for part of the European capability
shortfalls, the long-standing reliance on large conscript armies in most NATO
European countries, with the exception of Britain, is even more significant.
According to Heisbourg,
the single most important cause of the massive discrepancy between US and
European capabilities flows from European force structure policies … Indeed, the
Europeans reign supreme in one area, that of unusable and ultimately unaffordable
manpower. The forces of the European Union countries field 1.9 million under
uniform versus 1.4 million in the US … The net effect is that after spending for the
corresponding force structures, there is little left for European R&D, acquisition or
for O&M [operations and maintenance] spending. An extreme case is provided by
Germany, Greece, and Italy, which together field 800,000 military personnel (close to
60% of the US total) whereas they spend 12% ($8bn) of what the US does on
procurement (NATO definition).10
As Heisbourg suggests, some cases are more extreme than others.
According to an Italian analysis, ‘After Luxembourg, Italy is the alliance
country which currently spends most from its defence budget on staff
expenditure (72%, which mainly goes toward military pensions and the upkeep
of the national service system). Thus, in 1998, only 12.7% of its budget was left
for hardware … as against, for example, Great Britain’s 27%.’11 The most recent
NATO analyses indicate that the UK’s estimated procurement spending in
1999 as a percentage of the defence budget (27.5) was matched only by Turkey
(also 27.5), followed by the United States (24.4) and Norway (23.5).12 Political
and organisational obstacles often hamper attempts to introduce new defence
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spending priorities or to change methods of force recruitment and procure-
ment. France has, however, nearly completed its 1996–2001 transformation
towards all-professional armed forces. Italy, Portugal and Spain have also
decided to end conscription. Germany is, however, unlikely to abandon
conscription entirely in the foreseeable future.
François Cailleteau, a French expert in defence economics, has compared
the US military posture with the aggregate of the military postures of the five
largest members of the European Union (the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain), which together account for over 80% of its defence spending. Relying
on data from the IISS Military Balance, Cailleteau has concluded that US naval
tonnage is three times greater than that of the ‘EU five’ for nuclear-fuelled
ballistic-missile-bearing submarines (SSBNs) and surface combatants, and four
times greater for operational transport and support ships; that the United States
has 66 nuclear-fuelled submarines (SSNs), and the ‘EU five’ 18 SSNs; that the
US Navy has 12 catapult-launch aircraft carriers and 29 cruisers, and that the
‘EU five’ collectively have only one cruiser and one catapult-launch aircraft
carrier. While the ‘EU five’ have about 100 frigates against America’s 40, the US
frigates are of a single type and displace 2,800 tons; and the European frigates
are of ‘innumerable’ types and a third displace 1,300 tons or less.13
Cailleteau’s conclusions are similar for other military capabilities. For
modern combat aircraft, the United States has a 2.5:1 edge over the ‘EU five.’
For airlift, the US advantage is 3.5:1 in numbers of aircraft; and two-thirds of
the ‘EU five’ planes are C-160 Transalls, a third smaller than the C-130, the
smallest US transport aircraft. For tanker aircraft, the ratio is around 30:1. The
United States has 7,600 main battle tanks, all variants of the M1 Abrams, while
the ‘EU five’ have 4,800 main battle tanks, of six highly different models (AMX
30-B2, Leclerc, Leopard 1 and 2, Challenger 1 and 2). The US Army and Marine
Corps together have 1,664 attack helicopters, of which 753 are AH 64 Apaches,
with ‘firepower very superior to that of the Gazelles and BO-105s in the
European armies.’ Moreover, the US Air Force has 366 A-10 ground-attack
aircraft, for which the Europeans have no equivalent.14 The asymmetries are
also acute in C4ISR capabilities such as submarines, intelligence and com-
munications satellites,15 aircraft for intelligence and reconnaissance,16  and
offensive electronic warfare.
Capabilities gaps have furnished the backdrop for burden-sharing debates,
which have been virtually continuous since the founding of the alliance. These
debates have, for the most part, consisted of Americans asking Europeans to
increase their level of defence spending. During the 1950s, as their post-war
economic recovery proceeded, the Europeans could plead incapacity. Since the
1960s, Europeans have repeatedly stressed certain ‘output’ measures instead of
the input measures based on GNP percentages favoured by American critics of
European ‘free-riding.’ The outputs stressed in some European-authored
comparisons have downplayed capabilities gaps or have portrayed them as
favourable to NATO Europe. In 1990, Jane Sharp, a British commentator,
deplored
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the myth that the US bears a disproportionate share of the NATO burden, especially
in terms of the contribution of conventional forces. Despite continued complaints
about ‘free riders,’ European NATO countries provide 90 percent of the manpower,
85 percent of the tanks, 95 percent of the artillery and 85 percent of the combat
airpower in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area covered by the CFE [Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe] negotiation.17
Sharp’s statement is representative of the arguments advanced by Europeans
in burden-sharing debates during the Cold War. Except for aircraft, it omits
most of the advanced military capabilities relevant to power projection; and it
obviously makes no allowance for the qualitative distinctions that matter more
in combat than in arms-control negotiations.
Since the late 1970s, when the last great US defence build-up began with
President Jimmy Carter, the European allies have been unwilling to invest in
military forces, notably in modernisation and research and development, at
levels approximating those in the United States. The Carter administration
persuaded the allies to approve a Long-Term Defence Program (LTDP) and a
goal of increasing defence spending by 3% a year in real terms, but the
performance of the allies in meeting the goals was uneven. The LTDP
objectives included capabilities that are currently identified as key elements of
the gap, such as logistics, electronic warfare, and command, control, and
communications (C3).18 Similarly, the Reagan administration pursued a
Conventional Defence Improvements (CDI) programme that was formally
endorsed by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee in 1985. The CDI focused
on several of the same capabilities as the LTDP, but was equally unsuccessful
in preventing a widening of the US-European gap in conventional military
capabilities.  The magnitude of the gap in logistics, C4ISR, and long-range
precision-strike capabilities became publicly manifest during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm in 1990–91, but it was apparent to experts in the late
1970s and early 1980s.19
Despite reductions in defence spending in the United States and most other
NATO countries since the late 1980s, the gap between US and European
investments in advanced military capabilities has widened since the late 1970s.
The United States is far ahead of its NATO European allies in the assets needed
for large-scale joint and combined operations such as airlift, sealift, and
command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I). While this is
especially true of operations beyond Europe that would require the airlift and
sealift necessary for genuine ‘strategic mobility,’ it also applies to operations
within Europe.
Even in Bosnia, in close proximity to NATO European territory, the United
States had to augment existing NATO capabilities with unique communi-
cations assets. According to General Klaus Naumann, the German officer then
serving as chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, the United States
provided 46 of the 48 communications satellite channels used by the Imple-
mentation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia in the period December 1995–December
1996. In Naumann’s words, ‘It indicates quite clearly that without American
The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union  103
support, an operation like [IFOR in Bosnia] could not be done … There is no
security for Europe without the Americans.’20
Many French analysts and officials argue that, despite the obvious
capability gap, there is no technology gap. European science, technology, and
industrial assets are up to US levels, but the Europeans have spent less than the
Americans and have pursued different research and development strategies
and procured different types of equipment. According to an official French
Ministry of Defence analysis,
This conflict illuminated the differences between the military means of the United
States and Europe. The United States has developed extremely large military means
that are justified by America’s world ambitions since the end of the Second World
War. These [European–American] gaps also result from the research efforts and
armament programs underway [in the United States] since the beginning of the
1980s. … Our technological backwardness in certain areas, such as information
mastery in real time or stealth, is linked to the lower level of financial means
allocated to research (Europe’s defence research budget is a third of the US one)
rather than to the know-how of European companies. The Kosovo conflict has,
moreover, revealed quantitative deficiencies that could affect our ability to sustain
an operation of long duration as well as capabilities that were completely lacking
(cruise missiles,  radar satellite observation systems, offensive jammers, aircraft
identification systems).21
Some French observers contend that the United States has spent more not
only because it has security interests and commitments in several regions with
correspondingly immense logistical requirements, but also because it has been
engaged in over-insurance and excessive investment in the innovations
associated with the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.
The Gap in Operation Allied Force
Operation Allied Force consisted mainly of air operations, which involved 14 of
NATO’s 19 members.  Four nations – the Czech Republic, Iceland, Luxem-
bourg, and Poland – did not participate because they lacked relevant
capabilities, while Greece chose not to for political reasons. While non-US
aircraft carried out over 15,000 sorties, about 39% of the total,  US aircraft
delivered over 80% of the weapons.22  Certain capabilities were provided solely
or almost entirely by the United States, including offensive electronic warfare,
airborne command and control, all-weather precision munitions, air-to-air
refuelling, and mobile target acquisition. As a result, while non-US allies
conducted 47% of the strike sorties (principally during the later weeks, when
weather conditions had improved), they accounted for only 29% of combat-
support sorties for refuelling, command and control, and suppression of enemy
air defences (SEAD).23 Indeed, an average of three American support aircraft
was required for each European strike sortie.24
For airborne command-and-control during Operation Allied Force, the allies
relied on a US Air Force EC-130 Airborne Battlefield Command, Control and
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Communication (ABCCC), a C-130 designed for airspace traffic control and
battle management.25  Within NATO, only the United States has a dedicated
aircraft for this purpose. The NATO AWACS aircraft are optimised for early
warning, not for airspace and battle management. The United States also
provided most of the mobile target-acquisition capability via the two JSTARS
(Joint Surveillance and Target Acquisition System) aircraft it deployed to the
Balkans.
According to some US accounts of the operations, only the United States
employed air-launched all-weather precision munitions and the only all-
weather precision munitions utilised by any of the Europeans were the US-
built Tomahawks launched from British submarines. The French Ministry of
Defence’s two official ‘lessons learned’ analyses imply, however, that Mirage
2000D aircraft delivered laser-guided bombs at night and unguided bombs in
all-weather conditions.
France has very precise strike capabilities thanks to its laser-guided armaments, by
day for all of the offensive aircraft of the air force and navy (Mirage 2000D, Jaguar,
Mirage F1 CT, Super Étendard), and by day and night for the Mirage 2000D …
Moreover, the demonstrated capability of Mirage 2000D crews, in all weather
conditions and with sufficient accuracy, to deliver unguided bombs made us the sole
Europeans capable of participating in all the strike missions of the coalition. The
arrival of the Rafale will make new progress possible in this capability.26
With regard to air-to-air refuelling, over 90% of the sorties were accom-
plished by US aircraft. The published sources are not entirely consistent on
European aircraft contributions. According to the IISS, the United States had
‘some 150 deployed,’ while ‘France and the UK each had 12 tankers available
for the operation, and Italy and Turkey had two each.’27 The French Ministry of
Defence indicates, however, that France was able to deploy only 10 tankers
(KC-135s),  while the British Ministry of Defence reports employing only 9
tankers (4 Tristars and 5 VC10s).28 The US Department of Defense indicates that
39 British aircraft took part in Operation Allied Force, while the British Ministry
of Defence lists 48 British aircraft contributing to the operation.29
European contributions in Operation Allied Force were particularly strong in
combat air patrol; air-to-ground strike operations in good weather; and in
surveillance, reconnaissance, and battle-damage assessment with unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) and manned aircraft such as Tornados, Étendard IVPs,
and Mirage IVPs. While the Europeans and the Americans both made
successful use of UAVs, the capabilities of the US Predator far outweighed those
of the Franco-German CL-289.30 Thanks in large part to its satellites, superior
UAVs and reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, the United States met
‘approximately 95% of NATO’s intelligence requirements’ in Operation Allied
Force.31 As noted above, non-US allies made 47% of the air-to-ground strike
sorties, but the Europeans and Canadians were generally dependent on good
weather conditions; and most of their aircraft lacked secure anti-jamming
radios and digital- data links.
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Operation Allied Force also revealed that information systems pose great
interoperability challenges. As in many areas, the problems derive from the
rapid pace of US innovation and modernisation compared to that of the other
allies. The US military services have retained old-fashioned communications
capabilities, euphemistically called ‘legacy’ systems, to accommodate the ‘low-
end’ communications capabilities of US allies and security partners. In national
or coalition operations, it is essential for all participating forces to have a
‘common operational picture’ (COP).
Some European observers have argued that an innovator in information
systems must be cognisant of the potential as well as the limitations of allies. As
a British observer has put it, when colour television was introduced, those with
old TV sets could still get the picture in black and white.32 The interoperability
gap in information systems is worse than this analogy suggests, however,
because most allied navies have only a limited ability to receive imagery; their
encrypted communications capabilities rely mainly on voice and written
messages. According to one expert, ‘the biggest complaint of the allies’ is the
reduced reliance of the US armed forces on previous methods of com-
munications – encrypted voice and teletype messages. The US shift to
electronic transmission of schedules, maps, images, etc, via the SIPRNET, a US-
only secure communications network, is seen as excluding the allies.33
During Operation Allied Force, a significant proportion of allied air forces
lacked even encrypted voice communications:
Some of the operations security concerns were caused by disparities in the
communications security equipment available to US forces and their NATO allies.
The major differences were in the numbers and types of secure telephones at the
various headquarters and secure radios aboard aircraft … Some allied aircraft were
not equipped with either the cryptograph devices or keying material needed to
conduct secure communications with other elements of the force. As a result,
airborne command-and-control aircraft and other allied aircraft had to pass
information in the clear, severely compromising operations security. This situation
can only be corrected by ensuring all allied forces have the kinds of technologies,
equipment, communications, planning, and training that will make them fully secure
and interoperable.34
With time, some experts have argued, the retention of ‘legacy’ systems for
communications with allies and coalition partners will become costly,
burdensome, and impractical, if new US information systems cannot readily
communicate with the old systems. As a matter of principle, the US armed
forces will not ‘dumb down’ information systems or decline to develop them to
their full potential for the sake of interoperability. Current US policy is,
however, to retain ‘legacy’ systems for essential coalition communications.35
Interoperability problems highlighted in Kosovo include communications
connectivity and divergences in computerised planning capabilities. But the
most significant issues concern security. From a US viewpoint, there are
concerns about the security of US technology, intelligence, communications,
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and plans. These concerns derive from the implications for the security of US
and allied forces and their ability to conduct operations successfully.
The pace of the modernisation of US information systems has been much
more rapid than that of allied forces; and this has led to a widening gap in
capabilities. The officially proposed remedies include simplifying the
constraints on the release of information, reviewing and (when it is appropriate
to do so) eliminating or simplifying licensing requirements, and carrying
forward alliance efforts to establish interoperable communications archi-
tectures.36 The fact that information systems are increasingly based on com-
mercial off-the-shelf products could facilitate allied procurement of
interoperable systems, if the allies chose to make the necessary investments.
Increased use of off-the-shelf products would not, however, solve all the
problems created by the tendency of the US armed forces to rely increasingly
on US-only secure communications and information networks, such as the
SIPRNET. US reliance on the SIPRNET and other information security
constraints have forced the allies to devise what one expert has called ‘jerry-
rigged work-arounds’ and to institutionalise practices such as ‘air-gapping’. 37
That is, once a message has been certified as legally releasable and placed in a
releasable format, it is put on a disk and taken to a computer linked to the other
system; in this way, unwanted links and data transfers are avoided.
Electronic attack capabilities constitute one of the most significant areas of
continuing NATO European dependence on US military forces. Such
capabilities are essential to conduct air operations with minimal losses. Aircraft
flying at a high altitude beyond the range of anti-aircraft artillery are still
vulnerable to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) unless the target-acquisition
radars are neutralised by jamming or direct attack. Direct attack with a high-
speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) is feasible only if the enemy radars are
switched on. As in Operation Allied Force, however, the direct-attack capabilities
may deter an enemy from switching on the radars. The operational significance
of America’s EA-6B Prowlers has been well summarised as follows:
The fundamental mission of the Prowler is to seize control of key segments of the
electromagnetic spectrum in wartime, assuring that they can be exploited by friendly
forces while denying their use to adversaries … Control of the electromagnetic
spectrum has assumed a significance similar to command of the air, and that is
precisely what the 19 squadrons of Prowlers – 11 carrier-based (including one
reserve) and four expeditionary Navy squadrons, and four Marine Corps squadrons
— are designed to achieve … [T]he proliferation of advanced air-defence systems
around the world has severely compromised the survivability of nonstealthy aircraft
unless they receive continuous EW [electronic warfare] protection in combat.38
Aircraft with capabilities like US Navy and Marine Corps EA-6Bs are
essential to NATO air operations, because NATO European air forces lack
comparable capabilities.39 According to a French Ministry of Defence analysis,
‘The effectiveness of the American offensive jamming means is hard to
quantify, but their absence constituted grounds for cancelling the air raid’.40
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The United States is unlikely to sell such capabilities to the allies because of the
technology- transfer and intelligence-sharing issues (for instance, about the
design of enemy radars).  The allies must therefore develop such capabilities on
their own or continue to depend on the United States to provide this protection,
as in Operation Allied Force.
The NATO European allies have at least two programmes to develop
jamming capability for tactical aircraft: the Spectra integrated countermeasures
system for France’s Rafale, under development by Dassault/Thomson-CSF/
Aérospatiale Matra; and the EuroDASS (Defence Aids SubSystem), under
development for the Eurofighter by BAe Systems/Elettronica/ML Aviation.
Neither programme concerns a dedicated tactical jamming aircraft, however.41
This implies a degree of continuing NATO European dependence on US EA-
6Bs in combat contingencies. As the French Ministry of Defence pointed out,
Electronic warfare is an essential component of conflicts. In the framework of air
operations, the SEAD [suppression of enemy air defences] capability aims above all
to neutralise or to destroy the anti-aircraft threats that use radars for the guidance of
missiles or guns. It is composed of two complementary facets: the anti-radar mission
itself and the offensive electronic jamming to accompany attack aircraft … In the
operations in Kosovo, offensive electronic warfare means enabled the coalition to
destroy part of the surface-to-air systems and to reduce markedly the effectiveness
of the rest because of its threatening character for the adversary. We do not have this
capability, while other European countries possess anti-radar missiles and the Americans
have both these missiles and offensive electronic jammers.42
The missiles for attacking radars employed in Operation Allied Force were
US HARM on US, German, and Italian aircraft and British air-launched anti-
radiation missiles (ALARM) on British aircraft. The French have lacked an
equivalent capability since they abandoned the Martel in the early 1990s.43
Scenario-Dependence and Capability Gaps
Electronic attack assets may help to illustrate another gap: that between
America’s capabilities and its official aspiration to be able to conduct two major
theatre wars almost simultaneously. Assessing America’s capability to carry
out its declared strategy of being ready to fight two major-theatre wars
obviously involves judgements about reasonable risks and many capabilities in
addition to electronic warfare.44 It is nonetheless worth noting that the United
States reportedly deployed more than 40 of its available fleet of approximately
95 EA-6B Prowlers in the Balkans during Operation Allied Force.45 In view of the
redeployments of EA-6B aircraft and crews in Turkey, Japan, and the United
States to permit a concentration of these capabilities in the Balkans, Loren B.
Thompson has concluded,
Operation Allied Force proved that, at least in the case of electronic-warfare aircraft,
the United States did not have the capacity to prosecute two major theatre wars
simultaneously. In fact, it was not so clear that even one such conflict could be
supported over a long period while meeting other global commitments.46
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Some experts maintain that US authorities insisted on standards of
performance – such as no US or allied casualties – that called for force
protection requirements more rigorous than were envisaged prior to Operation
Allied Force. On some occasions, the ratio was one EA-6B to one strike aircraft, a
higher level of electronic attack protection than had previously been planned
for. Setting this high standard for force protection inevitably drove up
requirements. This explains why it can indeed be argued that, at this level of
electronic attack protection, the US lacks ‘the capacity to prosecute two major
theatre wars simultaneously.’ As with Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Operation
Allied Force has established new expectations and assumptions about
acceptable risks, at least in some circles.
In October 1999, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen and General
Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that US
participation in Operation Allied Force could not have been sustained at a high
level if major conflicts had erupted elsewhere:
Consistent with our defense strategy, US forces could not have continued the intense
campaign in Kosovo and, at the same time, been prepared to fight and win two
major theater wars … Should we have faced the actual threat of war [in Southwest or
Northeast Asia], we have detailed plans for redeploying committed assets to these
potential warfighting theaters. Ultimately, should we have faced the challenge of
withdrawing US forces to mount two major wars in defence of our vital interests
elsewhere, we are confident that we would have been able to do so, albeit at higher
levels of risk.47
This statement implies that Operation Allied Force was conducted with
exceptionally demanding force-protection criteria because they could be met,
in view of quiet conditions elsewhere. If US forces had been rapidly withdrawn
for action in the Persian Gulf or North-east Asia, Operation Allied Force would
have probably taken a different form. The NATO European allies might have
carried out a much larger proportion of the operations; and they might have
adopted different policies about force protection, targeting and collateral
damage.
Thus, as British and French observers have pointed out, Operation Allied
Force should not be seen as the last word on understanding US–European
capability gaps. Official French analyses have hinted at the limited value of the
Kosovo experience as an indicator of these gaps:
The United States has the quasi-totality of the capabilities employed in this type of
operation. The Kosovo conflict represents but a single scenario, from which it would
be impossible to derive complete and enlightening lessons in every domain.48
In other words, the nature and scale of the capabilities gap should be evaluated
across multiple cases, not a single scenario tailored according to US
specifications. The capabilities-gap concept too often reflects an unexamined
American assumption that US military forces and concepts of operations
represent the sole standard of excellence. According to one British expert, the
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US–European capability gap is ‘irrelevant if the Europeans can deal on a
reasonable basis with the threats at hand and conduct any necessary
interventions.’49
Some French and British observers have argued that the American-defined
way in which Operation Allied Force was conducted artificially inflated the
apparent gap between US and European military capabilities. It was the
Americans, according to this argument, who insisted on fighting much of the
war with stand-off air-launched weapons at a height of 15,000 feet; and this
approach played to American strengths in airpower and precision-strike
munitions.  These observers assert that it was the United States that insisted on
a ‘zero death’ strategy in Operation Allied Force. In their view, the Europeans
could have done this operation by themselves, even though it might have
lasted longer and would have meant accepting greater risks and losses.
Without US electronic warfare assets and other capabilities for the suppression
of enemy air defences, it is argued, the Europeans might have engaged in air-
to-air combat or resorted to other measures (perhaps the use of special forces or
ground force operations to create a ‘safe haven’ enclave for the Kosovar
Albanian refugees).50 One French observer has estimated that the Europeans
would have lost 20 to 30 aircraft, but that this loss would have been accepted
by European publics.51
In this event, the losses would have probably extended beyond aircraft to at
least some crew members – killed or taken hostage, without US combat-search-
and-rescue capability at hand to try to save them. France alone among the
European allies had such capability ready for use in Operation Allied Force. The
effectiveness of the US capability (as during Operation Deliberate Force in 1995)
and the comparative scarcity of European capability underscore how a
European-only Operation Allied Force might have taken a different form. The
British Ministry of Defence notes the advantages of such capability:
We relied on our Allies, particularly the US, for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
capability. The effect on the morale of Allied aircrew of the successful operations to
rescue the US aircrew on two occasions was very considerable, and showed the
professional competence of the Allies, while denying Milosevic propaganda
opportunities. We are looking at the requirement for a UK or European capability.52
If the Europeans had conducted Operation Allied Force by themselves, with a
different strategy, including a greater willingness to risk casualties, it is unclear
when and where the level of unacceptable losses would have been reached.
British and French observers have for years declared that the European allies –
or, at least, France and the United Kingdom – are not as reluctant as the United
States to take casualties; but it is hard to know to what extent this could
compensate for deficiencies in military capabilities. Britain gave every
impression during Operation Allied Force of being more willing to conduct a
ground campaign and to accept the attendant losses than any other ally, with
Germany and the United States at the other end of the spectrum.  The French
Defence Minister, Alain Richard, has nonetheless declared that there was ‘no
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US–Europe gap’ on the ‘zero-casualty’ issue in this conflict: ‘Both the
Americans and Europeans agreed to impose limits on operations in order to
spare lives.’53
It is certainly true that no single case can be taken as a definitive indicator of
a capability gap, and that the choice of strategy in Allied Force reflected
American strengths and preferences. In fact, the same pattern applied in three
major military interventions undertaken under US leadership with significant
European participation over the last decade: Desert Storm in 1991, Deliberate
Force in 1995, and Allied Force in 1999. The pattern reveals some facts about
capability gaps in specific types of operations, especially if conducted in certain
ways.
Why the Gap Matters
While the gap has many implications, including industrial and economic
repercussions, the relationship between the operational and political aspects is
particularly noteworthy. As suggested above with regard to allied information
systems in NATO’s Kosovo intervention, interoperability deficiencies can
impede effective combined operations and lead to vulnerabilities. Com-
munications security problems provided the most obvious examples in
Operation Allied Force. Moreover, the gap transfers disproportionate political
responsibility to the United States (in relation to America’s economic and
demographic stature in the alliance) because US operational assets are decisive
in conducting ‘high end’ demanding missions.
Capability gaps have been a constant irritant throughout NATO’s history,
most acutely during crises and conflicts. During various Cold War crises,
including those centred on Berlin and Cuba and on NATO nuclear force
modernisation, the most prominent capability gap resided in European
dependence on US nuclear forces and commitments. While the alliance
remains a collective defence organisation, in post-Soviet, post-Cold War
conditions its main operational tasks have included embargo and no-fly-zone
enforcement, humanitarian relief, large-scale interventions (Deliberate Force in
1995 and Allied Force in 1999), and peacekeeping (in Bosnia since 1995 and in
Kosovo since 1999).
Americans resent European ‘dependents’ telling the United States how to
run alliance operations, while Europeans resent dependence on US capabilities.
The US resentment has never been great enough to place the alliance’s future in
jeopardy, and the European resentment has never been great enough to
motivate European governments to substantially improve their capabilities
through increased spending and other measures. In its current and prospective
form, however, the gap could lead to unhealthy divisions of labour, new
resentments and burden-sharing debates, industrial ‘fortress’ competitions, a
weakening of alliance cohesion, and/or marginalisation of the alliance. As far
as unhealthy divisions of labour are concerned, two hypothetical risks are often
highlighted: that the Europeans might find themselves increasingly responsible
for manpower-intensive operations with a high risk of casualties, while the
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Americans would carry out the high-technology lower-risk stand-off precision
attacks and intelligence functions; and that the EU would take on the low-end
crisis management and peacekeeping tasks, while the Americans would
conduct the more demanding interventions and thus bear the main
responsibility for collective defence.54
In short, the gap has significant implications for the conduct of military
operations and for trans-Atlantic relations. There is no shortage of US members
of Congress willing to accuse the Europeans of being ‘free-riders’ and to
deplore NATO arrangements that seem to subsidise America’s economic
competitors. In Operation Allied Force, the irritations in some US political-
military circles regarding NATO’s ‘consensus’ decision-making system, which
requires unanimity, were summed up in Lt. Gen. Short’s declarations:
It’s my evaluation that NATO cannot go to war in the air against a competent enemy
without the United States. If that’s the case, and we’re going to provide 70 percent of
the effort … then we need to have more than one of 19 votes.
In General Short’s view, the United States should have told its allies: ‘We will
take the alliance to war and we will win this thing for you, but the price to be
paid is we call the tune’. 55
Of course, from the perspective of some Europeans, the United States did in
fact call the tune. The post-Kosovo EU decisions to seek a defence dimension –
including the December 1999 Helsinki ‘headline goal’ – may be attributed in
part to European frustrations during the Kosovo war (and during the
diplomatic manoeuvres that preceded it) with US political dominance, which
stemmed directly from US preponderance in military capabilities.
Increased EU and NATO European military capabilities would be in US
interests. Under current US national-security strategy, the United States has
many commitments in several regions and its military capabilities are severely
taxed in peacetime, to say nothing of crisis contingencies. Increased European
capabilities would lessen the overall load placed on US forces. Moreover,
enhanced European capabilities could neutralise the ‘burden-sharing’
argument for reducing or withdrawing the US military presence in Europe.
Improved military capabilities would also be in the interests of the EU and
NATO European countries. America’s European allies would be well-advised
to recognise the limits to US military power and the multiplicity of US security
commitments in other regions of the world. US military power is finite. If the
United States was engaged in another Korean War and/or another Taiwan
Straits crisis and/or another Persian Gulf war, it would have less military
power to dedicate to contingencies in Europe. Once the US Secretary of
Defense, on the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, declared that a
particular regional commander in chief – a CINC – was a ‘supported CINC,’
the military assets would start flowing in that direction. If it was, for example,
CINCPAC — the commander of US forces in the Pacific — NATO would see a
‘Kosovo in reverse,’ with US assets flowing from North America and, if
necessary, Europe and elsewhere to support operations related to Korea or
112David S. Yost
Taiwan or wherever that CINC had identified a requirement that had been
endorsed by his political masters.
The finite character of US capabilities and the risk of US attention being
focused elsewhere have been recognised intermittently during NATO’s history,
for instance, during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. It was also
recognised in the years immediately after the fall of the Shah in Iran and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, when the United States was so
preoccupied with South-west Asia that the allies became aware that some US
forces were ‘dual-hatted’ – that is, committed to serve as reinforcements in both
Europe and the Persian Gulf.  Furthermore, as the French have pointed out
over the decades, despite the fact that the United States has remained faithful
to NATO for over 50 years, the future course of US politics is unpredictable.
The potential constraints on US force availability could undermine the
hypothetical solution of EU reliance on US assets in Combined Joint Task
Forces to make up for European capability shortfalls. Although CJTF initially
appeared to some French observers as a means for the EU or WEU to gain
automatic access to alliance assets for European-led operations,  the North
Atlantic Council has been defining ‘arrangements for the release, monitoring
and return or recall of alliance assets and capabilities’ lent to European
governments for an EU- or WEU-led operation.56 The formula approved in
April 1999 – ‘The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO
capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations’ – represents a
rhetorical increase in the willingness of the United States and other allies to
support European-led operations through CJTF; but it falls short of the
automaticity originally sought by France.57
According to some European observers, particularly in France, de facto US
constraints (via the North Atlantic Council) on European access to commonly
funded NATO assets could become a point of contention in European–US
relations. Simplifying access by abandoning NATO’s consensus principle
seems improbable, however. If this principle was abandoned, an ‘easy-access’
arrangement for the EU could erode alliance cohesion and lead to potentially
risky situations – for instance, European-led operations utilising NATO assets
without the full endorsement of all the allies. If the contingency became an
Article 5 case (that is, if it threatened the security of one or more members of
NATO and therefore constituted a basis for action under the mutual-defense
pledge in the North Atlantic Treaty), the European allies would in all
probability expect US support. However, if the United States is expected to be
present for the ‘crash landings’, it will understandably want to be in for the
‘take-offs’ as well.
Purposes of the EU’s Defence Initiative
What do the European Union countries want autonomous capabilities for, and
what capabilities do they need for these purposes? The phrase ‘Petersberg
tasks’ is used as shorthand for the political and strategic purposes of these
projected force improvements. According to the June 1992 Petersberg
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Declaration of the WEU’s Council of Ministers, in addition to the continuing
collective-defence obligations of the WEU members under the 1948 Brussels
Treaty and the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, ‘military units of WEU member
States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humani-
tarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in
crisis management, including peacemaking.’58 In NATO parlance, these are
non-Article 5 tasks, including ‘crisis response’ missions. However, there is no
official definition – by NATO, the EU or the UN – of any of these terms.
Moreover, ‘peacemaking’ as carried out by NATO in Operation Deliberate Force
in 1995 and Operation Allied Force in 1999 looks like war-fighting.
In February 2000, French Defence Minister Alain Richard identified three
options for crisis-management interventions. The first would be a NATO
action, as in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the second option, ‘the EU would take
overall responsibility’ and ‘would make use of NATO headquarters such as
CJPS (Combined Joint Planning Staff) and SHAPE for the planning of its
operation, of the chain of command organised under Deputy SACEUR for the
command of the operation, and of the operational headquarters and troops
earmarked for NATO for its implementation.’ In the third option,
Should the NATO Allies decide not to commit themselves as such and the EU
members decide to do so, there is a possibility that the EU might have to rely on
strictly European capabilities to run an operation … For the moment, the Petersberg
tasks on the high end of the spectrum (similar for example to Operation Allied Force)
would require some capabilities that the Europeans do not yet have, but that they
have nevertheless decided to acquire. In the short term this option will therefore be
available only for more limited military operations.59
It is far from clear, however, that all EU nations share the objective of
acquiring the capabilities necessary to conduct interventions similar to
Operation Allied Force. Indeed, some expert observers, even in Paris, doubt
whether the objective of pursuing such capabilities would be endorsed by EU
nations such as Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.60  The ‘illustrative
scenarios’ envisaged in the EU’s force-planning process may throw light on this
question. No geographical boundaries are indicated for the Petersberg tasks. It
remains to be seen whether the Europeans will select scenarios that are
relatively modest, such as humanitarian and rescue tasks close to home, or
whether they will pursue more ambitious aims. In September 2000, French
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin suggested that the EU could intervene in Africa,
under UN auspices and in close cooperation with the Organisation of African
Unity. 61
For all the shortcomings of NATO’s classified C3 networks, they represent
the principal multinational C3 networks in NATO Europe. A key indicator of
the EU’s serious pursuit of autonomy from the alliance would therefore be the
development of classified C3 networks and associated intelligence and
information systems outside NATO. In view of the unwillingness of most EU
countries to increase defence spending, it is hard to imagine them investing in
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expensive C3 networks and information systems to avoid dependence on
NATO.
In other words, financial as well as political and operational considerations
stand behind the principle of minimising gratuitous duplication with NATO in
the pursuit of EU military capabilities. To be sure, as François Heisbourg and
others have noted, it is important to distinguish between ‘useful or damaging’
(or simply wasteful and irrelevant) forms of duplication.62 The Europeans (and
the alliance) need enhanced capabilities in air transport, in-flight refuelling,
precision-strike munitions, electronic warfare and other areas. The duplication
that could be most harmful to the alliance’s political cohesion (as well as being
militarily unwise and financially wasteful) would be establishing a separate EU
defence-planning process and command structure. In October 2000 US Sec-
retary of Defense William Cohen proposed that the 23 nations in NATO and/or
the EU establish a consolidated NATO–EU defence planning mechanism, a
‘European Security and Defence Planning System,’ with the European officer
serving as Deputy SACEUR functioning as a ‘strategic coordinator’ between
NATO and the EU.63
Major EU investments in classified C3 networks and associated intelligence
and information systems distinct from those of the alliance are most
improbable because of their cost. But it is worth noting that they also could be
wasteful and divisive, at a time when it is imperative (as became evident in
Operation Allied Force) to improve these capabilities within NATO. As the
British Ministry of Defence noted in a discussion of the problems caused by the
lack of secure air-to-air communications during Operation Allied Force,
[W]e were unable to exchange freely some operationally sensitive information.
Along with most Allies we used frequency-hopping technology and transmission
security measures, which provided some degree of protection. Increasing advances
in the technology available to countries suc as Yugoslavia will make these
procedures and systems more vulnerable and there is a need to enhance the security
of communications in a combined and joint framework.64
The EU’s ‘headline goal’ for 2003
At the European Union summit meeting in Helsinki in December 1999, the
member governments agreed on a ‘headline goal’ for improved military
capabilities:
To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline
goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy
rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out
in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps
level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000–60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily
self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities,
logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and
naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60
days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and
deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment
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for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and
supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial
forces.
Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in
the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport.65
The EU’s ‘headline goal’ for 2003 is cast in such broad terms that the
member states are almost certain to declare victory in meeting it. The ‘headline
goal’ suggests that the EU’s current aspirations extend to being able to
undertake operations like the SFOR and KFOR peacekeeping missions, not a
combat action like Operation Allied Force. As François Heisbourg has pointed
out, despite the ‘most demanding’ phrase employed in the ‘headline goal,’
Since the Council decision indicates that the number mentioned includes both
logistic units and combat support units, only 20,000 combat forces may be available.
Such a fighting force could not be deployed for the most demanding Petersberg tasks.
With such a force the EU could take over from NATO the KFOR operations in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Conversely, an intervention in a non-permissive
environment in Kosovo could not be carried out with such a force. And it is
questionable whether it would be sufficient in a semi-permissive environment. For
relatively large-scale sustained combat operations, the EU might need 50,000 to
60,000 combat forces. This would thus require a headline goal of 150,000–180,000.66
The capabilities required for combat actions – such as precision-guided
munitions, air-to-air refuelling tankers, heavy air-transport and electronic-
warfare systems – are expensive. To the extent that these are pursued, they will
be sought above all by France, Britain and a few other European countries. The
EU as a whole is likely, however, to remain heavily dependent on US forces for
C3, aerial refuelling, electronic attack, precision strike, intelligence, and other
functions. An official French analysis highlighted the assets of only a few
European allies:
Our principal European allies possess:
• certain specific technological skills: UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles]
for Germany, and SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air Defences] for
Britain;
• operational abilities in certain areas of combat, such as cruise missiles
for Britain, observation and intelligence with Hélios for Italy and Spain,
in-flight refuelling for all of these countries and the Netherlands, and
SEAD for Italy and Germany.67
Britain’s official ‘lessons learned’ analysis concluded in general terms that
NATO as a whole should improve its capabilities ‘in such areas as precision
attack weapons, secure communications and strategic movement assets’ and
that ‘we Europeans need to improve the readiness, deployability and sus-
tainability of our armed forces and their ability to engage in both high intensity
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operations and those of an expeditionary nature.’68 In contrast, France’s official
analysis drew more precise and pointed inferences as to European military
requirements. According to the French Ministry of Defence,
Specific points requiring further European consideration are:
• command and control of forces,
• all-weather intelligence acquisition,
• autonomous navigation systems,
• real-time data links,
• targeting and battle damage assessment,
• cruise missiles,
• all-weather strikes,
• offensive jamming and suppression of enemy defence systems,
• autonomous identification systems,
• support of operational means, [and]
• permanent presence of an aircraft carrier group.69
France’s aspirations for European autonomy in these areas are not mirrored
with any precision in the EU’s headline goal. It appears that it was necessary to
define the headline goal on a lowest common denominator basis that all the EU
countries could endorse politically and contribute to militarily, hence the focus
on ground forces for peacekeeping. The vague phrase in the French document
about ‘support of operational means’ may refer, among other things, to the
EU’s choosing not to articulate a requirement for a Combined Air Operations
Centre (CAOC) similar to the several CAOCs maintained by the alliance.
Even for peacekeeping, the EU’s dependence on US military support is
likely to continue. SFOR and KFOR require US assistance for many functions in
addition to the troops on the ground. These functions include the C4ISR
architecture, including many types of technical intelligence (for instance,
electronic and signals intelligence and various forms of imagery); electronic
warfare capabilities to be able to suppress Serb interference at short notice; and
logistics assets for the movement of large bodies of forces. Moreover, US forces
in Europe, including Marines afloat in the Mediterranean, are key elements for
emergency reinforcements for SFOR and KFOR to call on if they find the
situation getting beyond their capability. If a crisis led to a decision to extract
SFOR and/or KFOR, augmented capabilities for C4ISR, close air support,
electronic warfare, large-scale logistical movement and other purposes would
be required; this circumstance also implies continuing EU dependence on
NATO and the United States in particular.
Even with regard to the ‘headline goal’ of 50,000–60,000 troops, there are
ambiguities. If the deployable force includes, as the document implies, ‘the
necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other
combat support services’ and other support staff, the ‘tooth’ put forward by
this ‘tail’ may be well below 30,000 troops. It is also unclear whether the goal of
50,000–60,000 troops deployable for ‘Petersberg tasks’ will count the forces of
EU member states in Bosnia and Kosovo, on the assumption that NATO-led
peacekeeping forces are still deployed in these territories in 2003. (In August
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2000, 27,344 troops from EU member states were serving in KFOR.70 Since there
are about 12,000 troops from EU countries in SFOR, the EU today already has
around 40,000 troops engaged in ‘Petersberg tasks.’) Another unanswered
question is whether – despite the reference to ‘an additional pool of deployable
units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for
the initial forces’ – the EU member states will be prepared to generate the
180,000 troops that would be required for orderly rotations of a force of 60,000
troops.71
From another perspective, the EU’s declared force goals for ‘Petersberg
tasks’ appear remarkably unambitious, since they are similar to the goals
France announced for itself on a national basis in 1996. In February 1996,
President Jacques Chirac said,
We are in an era in which crisis prevention is of capital importance … Finally –
remember the Gulf War and the difficulties we had in assuming our responsibilities,
despite the quality of our men and their leaders – it is imperative that France be
capable of projecting abroad a significant number of men, 50,000 to 60,000, and not
10,000 as is the case today, in rapid and organised conditions.72
President Chirac advanced this goal as one of his justifications for
abolishing conscription and announcing that France would have all-
professional armed forces by 2002. According to Heisbourg, ‘By the time we
[the French] complete our reforms in 2002, … Britain and France together could
by then be able to field close to 100,000 fully-trained, fully-equipped pro-
fessional soldiers in short expeditionary operations.’73  Heisbourg’s judgement
appears to confirm the impression that the EU’s ‘headline goal’ was designed
to be readily feasible, with minor budgetary consequences. The EU’s aim seems
to be to project a sense of progress and movement by establishing a vague goal
that could, with minimal effort, be met.
If necessary, the EU could even plausibly pretend that the goal had been
met by assigning certain units special readiness categories: a ‘creative
bookkeeping’ means of meeting the target. Recourse to such solutions may be
attractive in an era in which the defence spending of most EU countries seems
likely to decline further. The disadvantages of such solutions for EU govern-
ments could include a loss of credibility vis à vis other countries (including the
United States) and their own publics if the EU’s operational performance in the
next crisis revealed little real improvement in capabilities.
The EU’s ‘headline goal’ implies an EU aspiration to serve in an SFOR or
KFOR-type peacekeeping role, and this implies in turn that the ‘peacemaking’
action would be undertaken by NATO, with a large role for US military forces.
For the foreseeable future, at least in major contingencies, European crisis-
response decision-making and action will in all likelihood require close
consultation with (and possibly participation by) the United States.
EU and NATO Efforts to Improve Capabilities
How is the European Union tackling the challenge of improving the military
capabilities of its member states? France has proposed that the EU examine
118David S. Yost
scenarios of the Petersberg tasks, from the simplest level to the level of an army
corps; this would make it possible for EU military leaders to estimate
requirements. In the presidency of the WEU and the EU during the latter half
of 2000, France convened a meeting of the EU defence ministers in September
2000 to examine the requirements flowing from the EU’s crisis-scenario
analysis and to consider potential force contributions by the member states.
This is to be followed by a capabilities-commitment conference in November
2000, with the commitments to be endorsed at the highest level at the EU
summit in Nice in December 2000.74
Reflections in the EU about capability goals beyond the fulfilment of the
‘headline goal’ in 2003 appear embryonic, where they exist at all. The June 2000
Venusberg Group report, authored by a group of defence and security experts
from EU and NATO European countries, stands out as a noteworthy exception.
The goals recommended in this report include an ability to ‘carry out a full
Kosovo-type operation without recourse to US assets’ by 2015 and ‘a common
defence by 2030’.75 The Venusberg Group report goals have not won support
from EU governments, however.
NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) originated in US proposals in
1998. The DCI’s goals were initially articulated in terse conceptual terms.
Operation Allied Force gave an impetus to the DCI and provided concrete
indications of operational shortcomings. In April 1999, at the Washington
Summit, the allies approved the DCI in the following terms:
We have launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative to improve the defence
capabilities of the Alliance to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational
operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions in the present and
foreseeable security environment with a special focus on improving interoperability
among Alliance forces (and where applicable also between Alliance and Partner
forces). Defence capabilities will be increased through improvements in the
deployability and mobility of Alliance forces, their sustainability and logistics, their
survivability and effective engagement capability, and command and control and
information systems.76
The DCI involves 58 areas for the improvement of NATO capabilities, to be
pursued through the Force Goals established in NATO’s collective-defence
planning process,77 an arrangement that includes all the allies except France. In
February 2000, Defense Secretary Cohen provided a list of allied shortfalls in
meeting DCI-related commitments:
• Less than half of the nations who have agreed to do so have made their full
contributions to an asset-tracking system for better logistical support.
• Less than half of the requested nations have contributed their full share to an
advanced intelligence network.
• Less than half of the nations asked to provide deployable command-and-control
modules – which will improve interoperability – have done so.
The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union  119
• Only two of the seven nations now providing air-to-air refuelling assets for the
alliance have met their contribution targets for a Rapid Reaction Force.
• Only one out of 14 nations assigned to work on a deployable headquarters that
can withstand biological and chemical weapons attacks is on track to meet the goal
by this year.78
This pattern is consistent with the continuing tendency of most NATO
European allies, including major countries such as France and Germany, to cut
their defence spending. The only exceptions to this tendency remain Greece,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
The US Defense Department’s March 2000 report to Congress on DCI
implementation by NATO allies referred to an ‘information deficit’ in this
regard, noting that ‘the information so far available does not provide a
sufficiently comprehensive picture of national implementation plans and
activities.’79 According to Frank Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, ‘While allies acknowledge their capability
shortfalls, few have made concrete efforts towards their amelioration by
increasing their defence budgets and reallocating funds.’80 Within the DCI
priorities, Kramer has indicated, the High-Level Steering Group is emphasising
‘strategic lift, especially outsized air transport; air-to-air refuelling; suppression
of enemy air defences; support jamming; precision-guided munitions; and
secure communications.’81
While DCI goals have been incorporated into the alliance’s defence-
planning process, the allies set no deadline for their achievement. According to
Diego Ruiz Palmer, who served until July 2000 as the head of policy and
planning in NATO’s defence support division, ‘We have a window of
opportunity. Now there is an interest in defence issues because of Kosovo …
[However,] a year from now, there could be a crisis somewhere else. There
could be economic problems. Other issues could take over, and then everybody
will forget about DCI and Kosovo … The nations have said they are not going
to spend a lot on defence, and not to expect miracles.’82
What is the relationship between the EU’s ‘headline goal’ and associated EU
efforts and NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative? EU documents generally
avoid referring to NATO’s DCI, just as they refrain from employing the NATO
expression ‘European Security and Defence Identity’.
There are nonetheless overlaps between the DCI and the EU’s headline goal,
in that both argue that ground forces should have improved C3I, sustainability
and strategic mobility. The DCI differs from the EU’s ‘headline goal’ in placing
more emphasis on improvements in ‘effective engagement’ – that is, power
projection and precision strike. Another major difference is that the DCI
highlights requirements that the EU documents generally do not even mention:
the need for defences against cruise and ballistic missiles and against chemical
and biological weapons; and the need for improved electronic attack capa-
bilities. As James Thomas has pointed out, more ambitious EU capability goals
would entail greater overlaps with the DCI:
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Meeting the requirements of the most difficult Petersberg tasks would also
furnish many of the capabilities needed to participate alongside US forces in large-
scale combat operations in, or beyond, Europe. This would help to reconcile the EU’s
Headline and Capability Goals with NATO’s DCI objectives of improved deploy-
ability, logistics, strike assets, force protection and communications, command and
control. On the other hand, if EU states choose more modest scenarios that
emphasise threats closer to home and only at the lower end of the Petersberg
spectrum, this is more likely to justify the continued slide in their defence budgets,
making transatlantic imbalances more enduring.83
Conclusion: Narrowing the Gap May Be Difficult
Efforts to build a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) in NATO – or
a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) in the European
Union – have been pursued under various labels for the past half-century. Basic
obstacles have proved difficult to surmount: a lack of political cohesion and
unity in Europe, an absence of a shared vision of strategic requirements, and
(on the part of several NATO European governments) an unwillingness to
spend more than minimal levels on military capabilities.
The reversal of current trends toward reducing defence spending in most
EU countries depends on at least three factors: economic growth; threat
perceptions; and the prominence of social priorities other than national
defence. Whether economic growth will lead to increased defence spending
depends in large part on the other two factors. As far as threat perceptions are
concerned, it is worth recalling that the EU’s Petersberg tasks – like non-Article
5 missions in NATO – are not vital matters of national or collective defence, but
optional interventions. Such interventions do not provide compelling grounds
for increased defence budgets in most NATO countries. Moreover, anecdotal
evidence suggests that threat perceptions in the European Union are not as
acute as those in the United States, which helps to explain European non-
comprehension of the US interest in National Missile Defence. Thus, increases
in Western European defence spending are unlikely. In an interview in April
2000, a highly placed French observer offered the following forecast:
The European military budgets will not be increased, because there is no sentiment
of being threatened in Europe. The increase in the US defence budget is
incomprehensible for a European today, when there is no obvious threat and when
the United States enjoys an overwhelming superiority over any potential enemy.84
As far as social priorities other than national defence are concerned, the
increased demand for pensions and health care is likely to constrain defence
spending in all NATO countries. According to Paul Hazell, the Director from
1992 to 1998 of the SACLANT-sponsored study The Implications of New
Technology for Maritime Operations in 2015,
In spite of the fact that NATO defence spending through 2005 is likely to be
relatively stable, thereafter the prospects look grim. All NATO nations will come
under increasing pressure to fund the retirement and social security/health costs of
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a growing number of post-Second World War ‘baby-boomers.’ At best, defence
budgets will remain level; at worst they could fall to 1% of Gross Domestic Product.
From 2005 to 2020, when the pressures on defence budgets will peak, the need to
replace major assets that were built at the height of the Cold War will become
paramount. Because of the reduced budget levels, and the continuing growth in unit
costs due to technical sophistication and falling production, the build rate for new
ships and submarines may fall to 25% of Cold War levels. This will have a massive
impact on fleet numbers, and could reduce the US Navy to 150–200 ships.85
The French economist Claude Lachaux has argued that demographic and
economic factors – these ‘stubborn facts’ – are likely to constrain West
European defence spending more than that of the United States. The first fact
Lachaux has emphasised is the changing demography of Western Europe: the
decline in birth rates and the decline in the number of workers relative to the
growing numbers of retired people receiving government pensions. According
to his analysis, the growing pension and health care demands of ageing
populations will make it difficult for European governments to increase
spending on defence: ‘How will governments be able to obtain funds from their
parliaments for high-tech armaments if the elected representatives of an aged
population are only disposed to vote for funds for high-tech medicine?’86 Other
studies have reached similar conclusions about the implications of demo-
graphic change:
In the United States, there will be one person older than 65 for every three of
working age in 2030, according to International Monetary Fund estimates. In Italy
and Germany, by contrast, the ratio will be one to two. In both those countries,
experts believe, the official figures hide the full impact because so many people
retire before 65. In all likelihood, experts say, Italy and Germany will have one
worker for every retiree in about 30 years. By some calculations, taxes will rise so
much in Germany and Italy that half of workers’ incomes will go to taxes to support
retirees, with taxes for other purposes on top of that.87
Lachaux’s second stubborn fact is the cumulative US advantage in spending
a greater proportion of GNP on defence and in pursuing greater efficiencies,
with less duplication and more attention to procurement, new operational
requirements and military R&D. In view of the fact that the United States
federal budget appears well enough balanced to permit Social Security reforms
and real increases in defence spending in the coming years, while balanced
budgets in Europe ‘appear, for a long time ahead, to be a dream,’ Lachaux has
forecast that the United States will continue to make a greater defence effort
than its European allies.88
Finally, Lachaux has highlighted the enlargement of NATO and the EU, in
conjunction with Balkan reconstruction efforts. Such endeavours also burden
the economies of the EU countries and promise to limit the funds available for
military capabilities improvements. Unless the Europeans can surmount such
stubborn facts, Lachaux has concluded, ‘their speeches on European Security
and Defence Identity will pass for pure rhetoric’.89 In short, continued declines
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in defence spending in NATO Europe are in prospect, except perhaps for
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Since 1992, NATO European defence
spending has dropped 22% in real terms.90 While US defence spending
declined by 37% in real terms from 1985 to 2000, 91 the United States nonethe-
less retained many of its capability advantages. An increase in US defence
spending in real terms will begin in fiscal year 2001. 92
Representatives of EU organisations and like-minded European officials
and experts frequently assert that the EU will be more effective than NATO in
getting its member states to increase defence spending or, at least, to gain force
improvements through more efficient spending. This remains to be seen; a
number of European observers expect the pattern of US–European capability
asymmetries to remain essentially unchanged, although marginal improve-
ments may be achieved via measures such as a projected pooling of air
transport assets by some European countries.
Britain, France, and the United States are the three nations most determined
to do something about the US–European capabilities gap.93 London, Paris, and
Washington all want to stimulate their European allies and partners to acquire
improved military capabilities. Their motives are different, of course. Most
Americans want more capable allies and coalition partners, though some have
at times manifested reservations about diminished European dependence on
the United States.  The British and the French both seek more political and
military options under national and/or EU control (and diminished depen-
dence on the United States) and the greater influence in defining NATO
strategy that would flow from increased capabilities. The British have played a
leading role in this regard since late 1998, when Prime Minister Tony Blair
announced, in a major change in British policy, an unprecedented readiness to
bring security and defence matters into the EU. The British nonetheless remain
more inclined than the French to think in terms of developing the EU’s military
potential within a broad NATO framework and in close cooperation with the
United States. The French are more apt to think of an EU capability distinct
from that of the alliance and US forces. As in the past, the concept of the EU as
an autonomous great power – what the French call ‘l’Europe-puissance’ –
commands more interest and respect in France than in any other EU country.
Long-standing patterns of capability dependence in transatlantic relations
appear likely, however, to be prolonged and may well be deepened by factors
affecting the willingness and ability of governments to spend on military
forces, such as the low level of threat perceptions in NATO Europe and the
imperatives of other social priorities in the EU. London, Paris and Washington
therefore face great challenges in their attempts to get significant improve-
ments in capabilities. The way forward will demand shared determination,
trans-Atlantic cooperation and coordination,94 and increased European defence
spending. This appears to be the only way to narrow the gap.
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